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Abstract: This study aims to assess and allocate the key risk events for public-private 
partnerships in Indonesian tollway construction and operation. The data were collected from 
a risk assessment survey of tollway companies in Indonesia based on two perspectives: the 
degrees of occurrence and impact. The top-ranked risk events (18 out of 55 risks) generated 
from the value-of-risk index are the focus of this study and the relationships among risk events 
are analysed and explained using risk mechanism models. Risks related to land acquisition 
were identified as the major risk events in the Indonesian tollway business and 10 out of the 
18 top-ranked risk events were judged as suitable for assumption by the government. The 
weather risk should be shared by both parties with the remaining risks borne by the investor. 
The findings are expected to be useful for government review of regulations and practices 
and for private sectors interested in investing in tollway projects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Risks are perceived as threats to project success or as opportunities to enhance 
the chances of project success (Project Management Institute, 2004). Properly 
selected and accurate information is crucial for risk assessment, especially for 
investment in large infrastructure projects. In many cases, risks are underestimated 
and allocated to parties that lack the knowledge, resources and capabilities to 
manage those risks effectively (Ng and Loosemore, 2007). Clear information as to 
what investors can expect and may face will assist them in considering and 
justifying their decisions. Additionally, with an awareness of the risks that they will 
face, investors can prepare the necessary plans to anticipate and mitigate risks 
such that calculation of project feasibility can be clearly and systematically 
forecasted. 
Many countries are currently considering the involvement of the private 
sector in infrastructure development through the use of public-private partnerships 
(PPPs). The participation of the private sector in public infrastructure is expected to 
increase efficiency and reduce the financial burden on the government. Many 
avenues exist for the private sector to participate in public infrastructure 
development, from a simple arrangement with less investment, such as providing 
service or management for the infrastructure, to complex participation with large 
investment, such as the build-operate-transfer model. In tollway infrastructure 
development in Indonesia, the participation of the private sector is greatly 
needed to meet the demands for accessibility and mobility because the total 
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length of the current tollway in Indonesia is far below the level needed to support 
economic growth (Kompas, 2008; 2009). 
Private involvement in the infrastructure sector is different from that of the 
service sector, primarily because infrastructures such as roads are expensive, 
capital-intensive, long-term and immobile (Gomez-Ibáñez and Meyer, 1993). One 
of the major constraints in attracting private investors to this sector is the risk 
management between investors (private companies) and governments, which 
has not been systematically carried out or properly provided for in agreements 
until now. Additionally, it has been argued that much of the risk in a PPP project 
comes from the complexity of the arrangement itself (Ng and Loosemore, 2007; 
Grimsey and Lewis, 2002). Meanwhile, wholly and naïvely adopting risk 
management concepts from developed countries may not be a wise option 
because the key problems that exist in such developing countries as Indonesia 
may not be the same as those in developed countries. An inappropriate 
distribution of risks may create new risks (Cooper et al., 2005) or lead to project 
failure (Ng and Loosemore, 2007). Risk should be allocated to the party that is best 
able to manage it at the lowest cost (Cooper et al., 2005; European Union, 2003). 
This paper attempts to fill the gap by assessing the important risk factors in tollway 
construction and operation and by properly allocating the risks to the party best 
able to manage those risks from the perspective of the investors. 
 
Tollways and Risk Management in Infrastructure Development in Indonesia                                
 
From 1978 to 2005, only 22 toll roads with a total length of 608 km were built and 
under operation in Indonesia (Badan Pengatur Jalan Tol, 2009). This number is 
quite low for such a large country as Indonesia in which land transportation is still a 
major infrastructure needed to support economic growth. The prior development 
of toll roads in Indonesia was carried out by PT Jasa Marga, the first tollway 
company in Indonesia and a state-owned enterprise. The initial participation of 
private investors in the toll road was limited under a joint venture scheme with PT 
Jasa Marga because, at that time, Indonesian law stated that only PT Jasa Marga 
was able to own and operate a toll road. Another Indonesian law mandated that 
the toll road right-of-way was owned by the government such that clearing and 
construction of the site should be authorised only by the government (Gomez-
Ibanez and Meyer, 1993).  
Considering the need for infrastructure development to boost economic 
growth, a plan to encourage participation from the private sector was unveiled 
during the Indonesian Infrastructure Summit in 2005. After the summit, three 
additional toll roads have become operational. These 25 toll roads consist of a        
677 km length of road, of which 516 km are operated by PT Jasa Marga. The 
remainder are operated by other private firms (BPJT, 2009). At present, five 
additional toll roads are in the construction phase with a total length of 97.70 km. 
Up until 2011, operation agreements for 20 sections of toll road with a total length 
of 736.18 km have been signed. 
The latest plan is to build a tollway connecting the western and eastern 
region of Java Island, from Merak, Banten to Banyuwangi, with a total length of 
1657 km by 2010 (Tempointeraktif, 2007). At present, only seven companies 
currently operate the toll roads in Indonesia. With the intensive expansion of the 
tollway infrastructure, additional companies have been awarded contracts for the 
PPP of Tollway: Risk Assessment and Allocation 
PENERBIT UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA/47 
new tollway systems, a portion of which are currently under construction (BPJT, 
2009). 
 The general procedure for risk allocation between the government and 
the private sector in infrastructure development is regulated by the Decree of the 
Ministry of Finance (38/PMK.01/2006). This decree is specifically intended as a 
guideline for controlling and managing the risks in the provision of infrastructure, 
including items related to contingent liabilities that have a potential to burden the 
government financially in the future. The decree demonstrates the government's 
willingness to share in project risks with investors and risk is broadly defined to 
include political, project performance and demand risks. However, this 10-page 
decree provides only general guidelines for controlling and managing risks. Only a 
few details regarding allocation and sharing of risks and operation and 
implementation of project risks have been translated into rules or regulations 
related to PPP projects. Much work still remains to improve and encourage 
participation from the private sector, including foreign investors. 
A study of risk management in Indonesian construction projects has not 
yet been fully explored and only limited references exist in the international 
literature, e.g., Santoso, Ogunlana and Minato (2003a; 2003b), Wibowo and 
Kochendoerfer (2005), Abednego and Ogunlana (2006), Wiraguna and Scott 
(2006), Voelker et al. (2008) and Wibowo and Mohamed (2010). From this list, four 
authors analysed aspects of risk related to PPPs and only two out of four are linked 
to PPPs in toll roads, i.e., Wibowo and Kochendoerfer (2005) and Abednego and 
Ogunlana (2006). The first example is specific to financial risk analysis and the 
second discusses good project governance for risk allocation. Sagalyn (2007) 
identified three generations of a public-private (PP) development "learning 
process" in which the public and private partners learned by doing in the first 
generation, followed by the establishment of companies specialised in this type of 
project. With intensive and extensive experiences in PPP projects that produced 
clear and well-organised policies, rules and regulations, a third generation will 
emerge in which PPP projects are initiated by private developers seeking public 
sector involvement. In this process, the involvement of the private sector in tollway 
construction and operation can still be categorised as first generation. Therefore, 
there are many opportunities for exploration and improvement of PPP in Indonesia. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
In this study, the analysis is focused on two main parties involved in the PPP: the 
government, which represents the public sector and the tollway companies, 
which are the investors that represent the private sector. Other parties that may 
be involved in this partnership scheme, such as banks and insurance firms, are 
assumed as not directly involved in the partnership. Their influence or involvement 
in the project is covered or represented either by the government or by the 
investor through risk transfer. Therefore, this study concentrates solely on these two 
main players. 
The secondary data for this article are obtained from two main sources. 
The first contains documents related to the tollways (e.g., feasibility studies, 
business plans, contracts, agreements or reports), which were collected from the 
tollway companies (investors) and the government. This group of documents 
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includes interviews intended to gather better and more practical information on 
tollway construction and operation (e.g., good practices in PPP, concession 
systems or financial aspects). The second source includes research papers on this 
topic for inputs on the theoretical and actual practices in other countries that may 
be considered for possible adoption in the Indonesian context.  
The primary data were collected by qualitative risk assessment through 
distribution of questionnaires to the tollway companies involved in the operation 
and construction of toll roads in Indonesia. Most are consortium companies 
established specifically for the project. The target respondents for the survey are 
key personnel at the management levels with many years of working experience, 
including a minimum of two years of direct involvement in risk management. 
Interviews and discussions were also conducted during the distribution of the 
questionnaires. It should be noted that at the time of this research, in addition to PT 
Jasa Marga (the first tollway company in Indonesia and a state-owned enterprise), 
there were only eight toll roads operated by private companies and another eight 
toll road projects under private companies in the construction stage. The available 
target respondents are quite limited in number; therefore, the research also put 
strong emphasis on interviews and discussions with respondents. 
Because this research was funded by the Ministry of Public Works, previous 
reports on the guidelines with respect to risk analysis for investment in toll roads 
published by the Ministry of Public Works (2005) were adopted as a reference. The 
guidelines have identified 55 risk events for the toll road investments in Indonesia. 
These risk events are categorised into nine categories: (1) political and legislative, 
(2) risks to tollway companies, (3) economic and monetary, (4) design, (5) land 
acquisition, (6) construction, (7) traffic, (8) maintenance and operation and              
(9) force majeure. 
A questionnaire survey covering the 55 risk events was designed to collect 
primary data and followed by a pilot study to minimise any possible ambiguities or 
confusions in the content, language and format. The survey was conducted in 
August and September of 2008. The questionnaire administrators were dispatched 
to tollway companies located in Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya. Two companies 
located outside Java Island (Medan and Makassar) were also targeted for the 
survey. The questionnaire administrators were sent to the companies to explain the 
research in additional detail and to ensure that the questionnaire was delivered to 
suitable respondents. Interviews were also conducted with the respondents during 
the visit.  
To be eligible for the survey, all respondents were required to have direct 
experience in dealing with the risk management aspects of tollway construction 
and operation. In the questionnaire survey, the respondents were asked to assess 
the risk events from two perspectives based on their experience and professional 
judgment: the degree of occurrence and the impact of the risk. The assessment 
was given an ordinal rating using the 5-point Likert scale in which 1 represents very 
low impact and 5 represents very high impact for degree of impact and for 
degree of occurrence, 1 indicates that it is very unlikely that the risk will occur and 
5 indicates that it is almost certain that the risk will occur. In total, 19 people 
responded to the survey. However, only 15 respondents gave the responses 
necessary to cover all risk events for this study. All of these respondents were at 
least undergraduate degree holders, two respondents had positions as project 
directors and four respondents were at the managerial level with two of them in 
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risk management and the others in operations management. The remaining 
respondents were members of the company's expert team. Six respondents had 
more than six years of practice in risk management. Five respondents had been 
involved in risk management for four to six years and the rest had at least two 
years of risk management experience. Considering the limited number of tollway 
companies operating in Indonesia during the time of survey, this amount was 
deemed to be sufficient. The tollway projects associated with the respondents 
were found to sufficiently represent the regional distribution in Indonesia, i.e., 
western and eastern parts of Indonesia. 
 
Analysis of Results 
 
The degree of occurrence of a risk measures the likelihood that the risk will occur. 
Additionally, the risk impact assessment evaluates the potential effect of the risk on 
the project objectives. Using the inputs of the respondents on the degrees of risk 
occurrence and risk impact, a risk index (RI) can be calculated by multiplying the 
mean value of the occurrence of risk with the mean value of the risk impact. 
 
RI = Mean (Occurrence) × Mean (Impact) (1) 
 
The same approach was also applied by Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos 
(2008) and Shen, Wu and Ng (2001) with discussion from Tsu (2002) for ranking the 
risk events in their research. 
The values of the risk index are ranked in Table 1. The means for 
occurrence and impact of each risk are calculated from the respondents' 
assessments of the risk events. Observations of the means of risk occurrence and 
risk impact indicate that the respondents seem to give higher scores to the impact 
rather than to the degree of occurrence. The results also show that the range of 
the mean of occurrence (1.40–4.13) is wider than the range of the mean of risk 
impact (1.67–4.00). One possible explanation for this result is that it is easier to 
measure occurrence because the respondents may have direct experience with 
the occurrence of a risk. However, it is not as easy to measure or to assess the 
magnitude of the impact and this may influence the tendency of respondents to 
give a higher score to impact than to occurrence. 
A correlation between risk events is very likely to exist. However, grouping 
of risk events into a more comprehensive and collective risk group to capture the 
correlation effects using statistical methods is not appropriate in this work due to 
the small number of respondents. To minimise this problem, an influence diagram 
explaining the relationships among risk events was constructed such that the 
possible correlations among the top-ranked risk events can be observed and other 
risk events that influence or are influenced by the top-ranked risk events can be 
expressed. The top-ranked risk events are defined as risk events that have means 
of occurrence and impact that are both higher than 2.5. This value is used as a 
reference with the expectation that it will extensively cover all important risks in 
terms of their occurrence and impact, instead of using the first 10 risk events, an 
approach that was commonly used in other risk-related studies. Using this 
definition, Table 1 shows the 18 top-ranked risk events within the bold line. 
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Table 1. Risk Index 
 
Code Risk Event 
Occurrence Impact Risk Index 
Mean Rank Mean Rank Score Rank 
R28 Delays in land acquisition 4.13 1 4.00 1 16.53 1 
R30 Over budget in land acquisition 3.80 2 3.80 2 14.44 2 
R40 Low traffic volume 2.93 6 3.80 3 11.15 3 
R7 Long procedure for decision and 
approval by government 
3.13 4 3.36 7 10.52 4 
R42 No increment in toll fee 2.87 8 3.60 4 10.32 5 
R12 Delays in disbursement of funds from 
investors 
2.79 9 3.43 5 9.55 6 
R35 Cost over-run in construction 2.87 7 3.20 14 9.17 7 
R29 Delays in payment related to land 
acquisition 
2.73 11 3.27 12 8.93 8 
R27 Project feasibility 2.60 15 3.40 8 8.84 9 
R20 Inflation 2.67 12 3.27 11 8.71 10 
R15 Credit related problems 2.57 16 3.36 10 8.63 11 
R10 Inability of government to fulfill its 
responsibilities 
2.60 14 3.27 13 8.49 12 
R38 Severe weather causes low 
productivity 
2.67 3 3.17 41 8.46 13 
R31 Claim from community related to 
land right 
2.93 5 2.87 26 8.41 14 
R19 Interest rate fluctuation 2.73 10 3.07 15 8.40 15 
R43 Fail in constructing the road feeders  2.67 13 3.07 17 8.18 16 
R8 Delays in issuing permits by 
government 
2.53 17 3.13 18 7.94 17 
R32 Delays in construction 2.53 18 3.07 24 7.77 18 
R44 Change in plan of road network 
which directly affecting the tollway 
2.40 19 3.00 20 7.20 19 
R25 Design change requested by 
government 
2.20 28 3.20 16 7.04 20 
R11 Problem with public acceptance 2.36 21 2.86 31 6.73 21 
R47 Unpredicted increment in 
operational cost 
2.40 20 2.80 32 6.72 22 
R9 Coordination problem among 
government agencies related to 
tollway 
2.33 23 2.87 27 6.69 23 
R13 Problem in managing income 2.15 29 3.08 19 6.64 24 
R5 Change in policy and regulation 
related to tollway 
2.07 32 3.20 21 6.61 25 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Code Risk Event 
Occurrence Impact Risk Index 
Mean Rank Mean Rank Score Rank 
R14 Agreement related problems 2.29 26 2.86 30 6.53 26 
R21 Bankruptcy of consortium's member 
or subcontractor 
2.13 31 2.93 29 6.26 27 
R46 Unpredicted increment in personnel 
cost 
2.33 25 2.67 39 6.22 28 
R16 Regulation related problems 2.29 27 2.71 37 6.20 29 
R3 Expropriation of the project by 
government 
2.00 34 3.07 25 6.13 30 
R4 Change in environmental policy and 
regulation 
2.13 30 2.87 33 6.12 31 
R2 Breach or cancellation of contract 1.60 48 3.73 6 5.97 32 
R1 Instability and insecurity of the region 1.71 46 3.46 9 5.93 33 
R26 Competition in tender 2.36 22 2.50 42 5.89 34 
R18 Exchange rate fluctuation 2.33 24 2.47 43 5.76 35 
R36 Lack of skilled or experienced 
workers 
2.07 33 2.71 38 5.61 36 
R54 Natural force majeure (act of God) 1.60 50 3.40 22 5.44 37 
R6 Change in business policy and 
regulation 
1.80 43 3.00 28 5.40 38 
R17 Restriction in financial transaction 1.86 42 2.86 34 5.31 39 
R52 Environmental related problems 2.00 35 2.53 46 5.07 40 
R55 Political force majeure (war, riot) 1.47 54 3.40 23 4.99 41 
R33 Problems with subcontractors 1.87 40 2.67 40 4.98 42 
R34 Over budget due to new safety 
standard and environmental policy 
1.93 36 2.53 47 4.90 43 
R39 Change in construction plan due to 
third party interference 
1.93 37 2.53 44 4.90 44 
R50 Low achievement of tollway 
operator 
1.73 44 2.80 35 4.85 45 
R24 Faults in contractor's design 1.87 39 2.53 45 4.73 46 
R23 Lack of design innovation 1.87 38 2.40 48 4.48 47 
R22 Faults in tender specifications 1.60 49 2.73 36 4.37 48 
R37 Problems related to construction 
materials 
1.87 41 2.29 49 4.27 49 
R51 Technology related problems 1.67 47 2.20 52 3.67 50 
R53 Asset transfer problems 1.73 45 2.07 51 3.58 51 
R48 Increment of import fee 1.53 52 2.33 50 3.58 52 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Code Risk Event 
Occurrence Impact Risk Index 
Mean Rank Mean Rank Score Rank 
R41 Faults in toll system application 1.53 51 2.00 53 3.07 53 
R49 Low traffic volume due to severe 
weather 
1.47 53 1.93 54 2.84 54 
R45 Road users do not pay toll fee 1.40 55 1.67 55 2.33 55 
 
The top-ranked risk events from Table 1 were allocated to the project stages 
based on the possible occurrences of the risks as displayed in Table 2. As shown in 
the table, eight risk events are linked with the land acquisition stage and nine risk 
events are associated with the construction stage. This observation strongly 
indicates the importance of land acquisition in tollway projects in addition to the 
construction process. 
 
Risk Factors of the Top-Ranked Risk Events 
 
In this study, the model proposed by Niwa (1989) for interpreting the risk 
mechanism concept in the form of a diagram was modified to explain the risk 
factors of the top-ranked risk events. In his model, Niwa grouped the risk events 
into environmental factors, which are not directly controlled by the contractor and 
managerial or operational factors/errors, which are directly controlled by the 
contractor. In this study, the risk events were categorised into three groups. One 
group consists of risk events that are controlled by the government and the 
second consists of risk events controlled by the investors. The third group is the 
shared risk group, if it exists. With this arrangement, risk events were also grouped 
together if any relationships existed among the risk events to provide a better 
explanation and a more extensive understanding of the interactions. The risk 
factors in the models were identified in discussions with two independent experts 
and three senior engineers with direct experience in risk management of a PPP 
project as well as the tollway companies. 
 
Risk Mechanism with the Main Focus on Land Acquisition 
 
The risk mechanism diagram for the abovementioned risk events is presented in 
Figure 1. Land acquisition has been identified as a major issue in the construction 
of tollways. Land acquisition/resettlement was also identified by Shen, Wu and Ng 
(2001) as one of the top 10 risks in Chinese construction joint ventures. To aid the 
government in acquiring land used for the construction of public facilities, the 
Regulation of the President of the Republic of Indonesia No. 36 on the Land 
Procurement for Implementation of Development for Public Interest was issued in 
2005 and later amended with No. 65 in 2006. However, land acquisition is still a 
major problem in terms of time and money. The delays (R28) and budget overruns 
in land acquisition (R30) are not only the first two risk events with the highest risk 
index, but they are also the first- and second-ranked items for degrees of risk 
impact and occurrence.  
 
PPP of Tollway: Risk Assessment and Allocation 
PENERBIT UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA/53 
 
Djoen San Santoso et al. 
54/PENERBIT UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA 
The results of the survey showed that the risk of delays in land acquisition 
has more influence both for the impact and occurrence than the budget overrun 
risk for two important reasons. The first is the delay risk directly related to project 
feasibility and commencement of construction; without land, investors cannot 
begin the construction and project feasibility is left hanging without certainty. The 
second is because the other six top-ranked risks (R7, R10, R12, R15, R29 and R31) 
contribute to the delays in land acquisitions. Therefore, additional attention should 
be focused on remedying this delay risk. 
Even with the regulations, the procedures and mechanisms of land 
acquisition do not give the investor confidence in the land acquisition process. If 
problems occur with the landowners and they refuse the offered compensation 
up until the deadline, based on the regulations, the committee for land acquisition 
can proceed with consignment and the procedure may move forward to 
revocation of the property rights of the landowners as a last resort if no agreement 
can be reached. However, the process of revoking the property right involves 
many parties and several steps before it goes to the president for a final decision. 
This process is time-consuming (R7) and carries a high probability of causing delay 
(R28). 
The inability of government to strictly impose a law or regulation (R10) on 
land acquisition has made the process more lenient. The friendly manner of 
discussion and negotiation approaches (musyawarah) in land acquisition 
encourages landowners to refuse to sell the land and to be eventually evacuated 
from their lands in many cases, usually with low offered price for the land as the 
reason. The musyawarah approach is, by nature, a good and courteous 
approach to discussing or solving problems with the intent of avoiding conflicts 
and is based on the eastern culture of respecting others. However, the acquisition 
process usually takes longer if this approach is subsequently used for negotiating 
instead of for socialising the acquisition. It is expected that the government should 
be more decisive so that time is not wasted in the process. Additionally, claims 
from the community related to land rights (R31) have complicated and prolonged 
the acquisition process. 
The increment of acquisition cost is also partially attributed to land 
speculators who buy land from lay people to resell at a higher price and by land 
brokers who act as middlemen for certain residents by promising a higher price for 
the land. At the present time, there is no clear government policy that strictly 
prevents these practices. The musyawarah approach also allows land brokers and 
speculators to demand higher land prices. 
All of these drawbacks have made land acquisition a time-consuming 
and costly process. One extreme case of land acquisition problems is the example 
of the Depok-Antasari tollway in which the actual cost for land acquisition was 
three times higher than the estimated cost (Koran Tempo, 2008). This problem exists 
not only in Indonesia but also in Thailand, as in the case of the construction of rail 
transit (Bangkok Skytrain) in Bangkok (Phang, 2007). 
Another issue in land acquisition is the availability of cash. The land 
acquisition committee will not approach the landowners before the committee is 
certain that the money is available. Because the land acquisition cost is still borne 
by the investors, the availability of funds (R15) and disbursement of funds from the 
investor (R12) are crucial to smoothing and speeding the acquisition process. 
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A delay in cash availability means a delay in payment (R29) that will 
consequently delay the acquisition (R28). However, because investors are usually 
time-conscious, cash availability is not often the problem and its contribution to 
prolonging the land acquisition process is relatively small compared with the other 
factors explained in the previous paragraph. Therefore, most of the applicable 
factors are under the control of the government. 
If the land is not ready, the tollway cannot be built. Therefore, delays in 
acquiring the land will delay the construction (R32) and subsequently, the 
operation of the tollway. This risk also influences the feasibility of the project (R27). 
Considering the importance of this risk, it was ranked first for both the degrees of 
impact and occurrence. The delay risk with the risk of an additional cost of 
acquiring the land (R30) will change the entire expectation of the investment 
scheme, particularly the estimation of return on investment. Because most of the 
sources of problems are not under the control of investors, the government can 
compensate the investor by providing a longer concession period or reviewing the 
toll fee agreement. 
Because land acquisition has become a source of frustration for investors, 
a land capping agreement has been implemented for certain tollway 
agreements. With the land capping clause of 110%, if the cost of land acquisition 
soars, the investors are now only responsible for a maximum of 110% of the 
estimated land acquisition cost and the remainder should be shouldered by the 
government. A funding scheme has been additionally established by the 
government to lend cash for land acquisition through the Agency Fund for Public 
Services (Badan Layanan Umum). Although the policy provides a safeguard for 
the investor only in financial terms and not in terms of time, it is expected to rebuild 
the private sector's confidence in tollway investment. There is a strong suggestion 
from investors that the entire process of land acquisition, including financing, 
should be taken over by the government so that investors can focus solely on the 
construction phase. In research on PPPs in construction projects in various 
countries, Li et al. (2005) in the UK, Shen, Platten and Deng (2006) in Hong Kong, 
Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos (2008) in Greece and Ke et al. (2010) in China 
also concluded that the risk of site availability is better retained by the public 
sector because the government has the experience and resources to address this 
risk, particularly in the legal power to ensure that the required land is obtained. 
However, at this moment, this suggestion is still under consideration in Indonesia. 
 
Risk Mechanism with the Main Focus on Traffic Volume and Toll Fee 
 
Traffic volume is one of the main factors influencing the investors' decision to invest 
in a tollway. Grimsey and Lewis (2002) emphasise that PPP projects are viable only 
if a reliable, long-term revenue stream can be established, which makes revenue 
risk the greatest risk to the commercial feasibility of a project. However, it is difficult 
to accurately predict traffic volume, especially for the long term. In their study, 
Wibowo and Kochendoerfer (2005) found that traffic on a toll road has a 
significant impact on the cash flow of investors and creditors, particularly in the first 
year of operation.  
As in many investment decisions, investors must carry out their own 
estimations, judgments and decisions whether to invest in the project based on the 
available information. The estimation of demand may include the planned road 
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construction that will feed the tollway (R43). Whatever information is used to 
analyse the demand, it is up to the investors' judgment to include or exclude the 
various parameters in their estimation depending on the level of risk they are 
willing to accept. A tollway project can be considered as an investment project 
and thus the risks related to income should be borne by the investor. Additionally, 
there is also the possibility that the government may change the road network to 
better serve the public in a way that directly affects the users of the tollway.  
Many planned toll roads did not materialised because the investors were 
not interested in the projects due to financial feasibility and low traffic volume 
(R40). In a situation where there is no strong indication that traffic volume will 
provide sufficient income for the investor, governments may share the risk to 
attract investors. Two possible schemes exist for this purpose. First, the government 
guarantees a minimum traffic volume such that if the volume falls below the 
minimum figure, it will be the responsibility of the government (downside risk 
protection). However, when the actual traffic volume is higher than that 
predicted, the difference will be allocated to the tollway company. The second 
scheme is downside risk protection with a clawback provision, a modification of 
the first scheme with an agreement that the government guarantees the minimum 
traffic volume; however, if the traffic volume is higher than the minimum figure, the 
difference should be shared with the government. 
Previously, the Indonesian toll road regulations specified that all toll 
increases are at the discretion of the president, which was problematic for private 
investors, particularly those without any political connections (Gomez-Ibáñez and 
Meyer, 1993). However, with the Government Regulation No. 15/2005 regarding 
toll roads, the toll fee will be reviewed and adjusted every two years. However, the 
adjustment is calculated with reference to the existing fee and the inflation rate. 
The decision ultimately belongs to the concerned Minister and political issues often 
have a stronger role in the decision than inflation or business considerations. As 
indicated by Wells and Gleason (1995), infrastructure projects are quite vulnerable 
as a target of opposition politicians to discredit the government. Changes in policy 
and regulations related to roads or tollways may also directly affect the toll fee 
decisions. If there is an indication of appropriation of the tollway by the 
government, the above two risk factors will most likely reduce the investor's profits 
(Phang, 2007). All of these factors are regulated by the government. 
Traffic demand forecasting is never an easy task and is generally unable 
to produce certain and absolute results. The uncertainty of these forecasts remains 
quite high, depending on the available data for forecasting. Additionally, another 
important risk related to the construction of the road feeders (R43) also directly 
contributes to the increase or decrease in the traffic volume. Therefore, the risk of 
traffic volume, with a risk index of 11.15, is more considerable than the risk of toll 
fee increase (risk index: 10.32) both for impact and occurrence. The provisions of 
Government Regulation No. 15/2005, which regulates the toll fee as previously 
explained, may also reduce the concerns of the investors in the toll fee risk relative 
to the demand risk.  
Low traffic volume (R40) and no increment in toll fee (R42) are two risk 
events that directly relate to income. If the income is less than the forecast or the 
operational cost cannot be covered by income, there is a strong tendency to 
reduce the maintenance cost, which influences the level of service to the users. 
Therefore, it is important that the quality of service should be clearly specified in 
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the agreement to avoid this conflict (Hard, 2003). For the case of Indonesia, a 
minimal standard of service (standar pelayanan minimal, SPM) has been 
established and implemented for this purpose. Income less than that projected 
also affects the ability of the investor to pay debt to creditors. If the situation 
continues and causes financial problems (cash flow and financial distress), debt 
restructuring may be carried out. The diagram explaining these two risk events is 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Risk Mechanism with the Main Focus on Traffic Volume and Toll Fee 
 
Risk Mechanism with the Main Focus on Cost Overrun 
 
Cost overrun has been identified as one of essential risks in the construction stage 
of a PPP project and is typically affected by design changes instigated by the 
public sector client (Bain, 2010). The survey result positioned this risk in seventh 
place. Referring to the allocation of risks in the project stage, as shown in Table 2, 
the cost overrun risk is ranked second after delays in disbursement of funds from 
investors (R12) and is among the top-ranked risks in the construction stage. 
However, it should be noted that the degree of occurrence for this risk (2.87) is 
higher than that of the delay in fund disbursement (2.79), which indicates that this 
risk was considered to occur more often than the fund disbursement risk. 
Provisions for new safety standards and environmental policies imposed 
by the government may have an impact on the project cost as well, as shown in 
Figure 3, but compensation for this cost can usually be sought. The government 
can intervene in the construction phase by requiring change orders which, 
depending on their magnitude, may influence the total construction cost and 
time. The change orders may be carried out because the design revision is 
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necessary for certain technical reasons. It is also possible that change orders are 
pursued due to political reasons (third party interference, R39). However, if the 
government does request change orders that cause additional costs and time, 
the investor can normally claim cost reimbursement and time extension by 
contract agreement. Similar to the case of new safety and environmental related 
policies imposed after the contract agreement, investors are generally eligible for 
compensation under the contract agreement. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Risk Mechanism with the Main Focus on Cost Overrun 
 
Other factors, such as managerial and technical problems during construction 
and errors in estimation, should remain the responsibility of the investor as the 
planner, executor and manager of the construction process. Therefore, the risk of 
cost overrun in the construction phase is primarily under the control of investors 
because government involvement is relatively minimal at this stage. 
Interest rate fluctuation and inflation (R20) are factors that are managed 
to a certain extent by the government through control of the money supply using 
interest rates, open market operations and setting of banking reserve requirements 
to balance the money supply and economic growth (Taylor, 2008). However, 
before investing in a project, an investor should analyse these factors in the 
business plan. For the operation of toll roads in Indonesia, the inflation rate is one 
factors that has a significantly influence in the toll fee adjustment. Thus, all possible 
inflation rate fluctuations should be considered in advance so that a case such as 
the Malaysia North-South Highway, which suffered a 75% cost overrun largely due 
to an inadequate allowance made for inflation (Ng and Loosemore, 2007), can 
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be avoided. With this consideration, the inflation and interest rate fluctuations are 
assigned to the investor as a risk of investing. These allocations are quite surprising, 
especially considering that this perspective comes from the investors. The result is 
somewhat in line with PPP research in the UK (Li et al., 2005), which is deemed a 
mature PPP market. The inflation risk for PPP construction projects in UK is allocated 
primarily to the private sector but with perceived opportunities for sharing with the 
government. Meanwhile, the interest rate fluctuation is solely the responsibility of 
the investor (Li et al., 2005). Phang (2007) (in his research on urban rail transit PPPs) 
and Cooper et al. (2005) also concluded that these two risks are better allocated 
to the private sector (investor). Other studies (Ke et al., 2010; Roumboutsos and 
Anagnostopoulos, 2008; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004) considered that both risks should 
be shared or negotiated. The reasons for this perspective may be that both parties 
may not be able to handle these issues alone and investors have little influence 
over such volatility. The role of the government in influencing the inflation and 
interest rates may also contribute to the shared consideration. Problems with cost 
overrun will certainly influence the financial situation or the cash flow of the project 
as a result. 
 
Risk Mechanism with the Main Focus on Project Feasibility 
 
The risk of project feasibility falls in the earlier stages of a project (development, 
detailed design and land acquisition) and is ranked ninth in the list. The risk 
mechanism diagram for project feasibility is illustrated in Figure 4. At the 
development stage during which bid documents are prepared, possible unfairness 
in the bidding process or an unreasonable stipulation in the bid or contract 
document may force an investor to withdraw. Assuming that fairness in the 
bidding process, this stage still contributes to a high degree of uncertainty for 
investors due to competition in tender (R26). The bidders should also finance 
several costs to provide the proposal and to participate in the tender process, 
including the cost of constructing a construction and business plan, which is a cost 
that will not be recovered if the candidate does not win the bid. Even after the 
project is awarded to the winner, execution problems in land acquisition may 
require more time and/or money than expected. The prolonged delays and the 
soaring costs of land may cause the investor to think twice as to whether to 
continue the project. Therefore, the impact of this risk is relatively higher than the 
degree of occurrence compared with other risks in the top 10 list. 
Problems in land acquisition (R28 and R30) may be politicised to discredit 
the government (Wells and Gleason, 1995) and may end with shifting the location 
of toll route as a solution. This solution will certainly change the layout (R25) and, in 
most cases, will usually incur additional cost and longer time to completion. 
Interference from a third party (R39) with political influence in the name of public 
interest may also affect the feasibility of the project in the worst case. If the project 
can proceed, it may need to be rerouted or redesigned as a result. These 
problems may also force the investor to abandon the project if no reasonable 
compensation is offered to justify the variation. Limited information gathered 
during the tender stage may not equip investors with sufficient data with respect 
to the ground conditions and assumptions may need to be made in the analysis. If 
the ground condition is highly different from the available information and 
significantly influences the total cost of the project, the investor may reconsider 
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the continuation of the project. Special clauses in the contract agreement are 
recommended for sharing this risk. Nevertheless, the degree of occurrence of this 
risk (reaching an extreme case) is quite small. 
 
 
Figure 4. Risk Mechanism with the Main Focus on Project Feasibility 
 
Risk Mechanism with the Main Focus on Delays in Construction 
 
Similar to the cost overrun in construction (R35), delays in construction (R32) could 
be affected by risk factors controlled by the government, including delays in 
issuing permits (R8), delays in land acquisition (R28) and change orders. However, 
again, these types of delays are usually accompanied with time extensions and 
possible financial compensation by the government. Because the time extension 
from the government due to this risk is typically stipulated in the contract 
agreement, no considerable effects have resulted from these risk events. 
However, when the delays are due to financial (R12 and R15), 
management (R33 and R37) and technical risks (R24 and R36) under the control of 
the investor (as shown in Figure 5) and may indicate incompetency in the investor, 
work should be sped up to compensate for the time loss to complete the project 
on schedule. From the value of risk index, this risk falls in the top-ranked risk events, 
but due to the consideration that investors are mostly in charge of this risk, it was 
ranked at the bottom of the list. It should be noted that the risks related to 
financing are of major concern because two risk events (R12 and R15) that play a 
role in the delays in construction also appear in the top-ranked list. 
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Figure 5. Risk Mechanism with the Main Focus on Delays in Construction 
 
Severe weather conditions (R38) certainly influence the progress of construction 
work. Because this risk is not manageable by the investor or by the government, 
the consequences should be shared. The government can provide reasonable 
time extensions and the risk of financial losses due to unproductive days is borne 
by the investor.  
With the above explanations of the mechanism of the top-ranked risk 
events, the allocation of risks can be summarised in Table 3 along with 
comparisons from other studies related to PPP projects. Although this study is 
limited to the perspective of investors in tollway construction and operation in 
Indonesia, the results are comparable with studies from other countries. Ten out of 
18 risk events are judged as suitable to be shouldered by the government. One risk 
event, severe weather, should be shared between the government and the 
investor while the remainder are allocated to the investor.  
 
Table 3. Comparison of Risk Allocation in PPPs with Other Literature Results 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this study was to assess and allocate the important risk events in 
PPPs for tollway construction and operation in Indonesia. The primary data for the 
study were gathered from a qualitative risk assessment survey. Interviews and 
discussions were also conducted to strengthen the findings.  
Fifty-five risk events were assessed by the respondents using a 5-point Likert 
scale for the degrees of occurrence and impact. Based on the assessment, a R1 
was estimated and used as a reference to classify the importance of the individual 
risk events. The top-ranked risk events were selected and allocated to the various 
project stages for analysis. The allocations to the project stage showed that 8 out 
of 18 risks are related to the land acquisition process, while 9 out of 18 risk events 
occur in the construction stage. This observation indicates the importance of the 
land acquisition stage (in addition to the construction process of a PPP project) 
from the perspective of the investors. The risk mechanism diagram developed by 
Niwa (1989) was adopted with modifications to explain the relationship and 
interaction between risk events and risk factors. 
Land acquisition problems, which represent the major risks in the top-
ranked risk event list, lie mainly under the control of the government. These risks 
trigger long delays and cost overruns. Cash available to investors also contributes 
to delays because investors are currently responsible for the cost of land 
acquisition. However, the degree is considered less significant than other factors 
that influence land acquisition. Investors should focus on the estimation of tollway 
volume in their financial calculations because this is a factor considered an 
investment risk and thus should be borne by the investors. Available information on 
road feeders planned to support the tollway should be prudently included 
because the road construction may not materialise. The tollway agreement should 
also clearly include a specific clause on procedures for toll fee increments and 
schedules. Reliance on available regulations may not provide a strong foundation 
if political issues are involved. Cost overruns in the construction stage, excluding 
change orders, are solely the responsibility of the investors. Inflation and interest 
rates should be also carefully considered in the cost estimation process. The 
project feasibility risk is mostly affected by factors within the scope of government 
control, particularly if the continuity of the project is challenged with prolonged 
land acquisition problems. Whatever the reason and the factor, the risk will lead to 
monetary and time losses for the investors. Investors should also focus on cash flow 
in financing the construction of the project because this problem may have 
significant effects on the completion of the project. 
These findings are expected to be useful for the government as sources for 
review and upgrade of the regulations and practices of tollway investment risk 
management. The government should concentrate additional attention on 
reviewing the regulations and agreements that can ease the risks related to the 
land acquisition process so that additional private investors can be attracted to 
participate in infrastructure development. Acquisition of land for development by 
the government before offering the tender is one option that should be 
considered. These findings are also expected to provide the private sector with an 
extensive description of the challenges and opportunities inherent in the risk 
administration of investing in tollway projects in Indonesia.  
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Although this study was limited to the perspective of investors in Indonesia, 
the preferred allocation of risks is comparable to that of studies in other countries, 
which indicate that the findings may equally apply to the risk management of 
infrastructure sectors in other developing and developed nations. The relative 
importance of the risks may differ due to country-specific conditions and the 
maturity of the PPP market.  
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